In another post, I analyzed the first group of argumentative rules that aim to ensure the rationality of general practical discourse. In this post, I examine the second group, which Alexy (1989, p. 191-195) calls rationality rules and formulates as follows:
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Basic rules ensure a minimum of rationality in argumentation
In the previous post, I presented an overview of Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation. I explained that he argues that legal discourse is a type of general practical discourse and that the rationality of discourses is ensured by adherence to argumentative rules.
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Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation
From the cover of his first book, Robert Alexy has been using the terms discourse and argumentation synonymously. Despite this pattern of usage, he (Alexy, 1989, p. 180) favors the word discourse, as he names his theory of argumentation a theory of discourse. Alexy (1989, p. 180) further classifies his theory as normative because it does not aim to describe the rules of argumentation actually employed by specific individuals, but rather to prescribe the rules that make discourses rational.
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Evaluation of Pierluigi Chiassoni’s approach to legal interpretative directives
Chiassoni’s approach is only useful for accurately identifying the primary, secondary, and tertiary directives that judges adopt in their decisions, as he does not present parameters for evaluating the correctness of the use of these directives. This lack of evaluation criteria stems from Chiassoni’s skeptical theoretical assumptions about judicial interpretation.
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