Introduction
This post deals with the distinction between internal and external justification of judicial decisions according to Robert Alexy.
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Special case thesis
Introduction
The subject of this post is the special case thesis formulated by Robert Alexy. According to this thesis, legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse.
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Limits of general practical discourse according to Robert Alexy
Introduction
This post aims to analyze the limits of general practical discourse and why they make legal discourse necessary.
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Rules of transition between general practical discourse and other types of discourse in Robert Alexy’s view
Introduction
This post deals with the rules of transition between general practical discourse and other types of discourse. In the general practical discourse, value judgments and norms that oblige, allow or prohibit certain actions to be practiced are discussed. The other types of discourse are necessary when questions arise about facts, language problems, and discourse theory. These rules apply equally to legal discourse because it is a special case of general practical discourse.
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Argumentative rules that define the content of norms and value judgments according to Robert Alexy
Introduction
In this post, I examine the argumentative rules that directly define the content of norms and value judgments in general practical discourse. These rules are called justification rules by Robert Alexy (1989, p. 202) and are transcribed and examined in the next section. Since legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse, the rules of the latter apply to the former as well.
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Six forms to justify norms and value judgments from Robert Alexy’s perspective
Introduction
The theme of this post is six forms to justify a norm complied with by an individual in a concrete situation. These forms also serve to justify a value judgment applied by an individual in a concrete situation. The forms establish procedures of justification, but do not define the content of norms and value judgments.
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How to rationally distribute the burden of argumentation
In this post, I analyze the rules for allocating the burden of argument. They aim to rationally regulate the situations in which speakers are obliged to provide arguments in general practical discourses. Robert Alexy (1989, p. 196-197) developed them as follows:
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Rationality of argumentation depends on equal argumentative rights and justifiable assertions
In another post, I analyzed the first group of argumentative rules that aim to ensure the rationality of general practical discourse. In this post, I examine the second group, which Alexy (1989, p. 191-195) calls rationality rules and formulates as follows:
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Basic rules ensure a minimum of rationality in argumentation
In the previous post, I presented an overview of Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation. I explained that he argues that legal discourse is a type of general practical discourse and that the rationality of discourses is ensured by adherence to argumentative rules.
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Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation
From the cover of his first book, Robert Alexy has been using the terms discourse and argumentation synonymously. Despite this pattern of usage, he (Alexy, 1989, p. 180) favors the word discourse, as he names his theory of argumentation a theory of discourse. Alexy (1989, p. 180) further classifies his theory as normative because it does not aim to describe the rules of argumentation actually employed by specific individuals, but rather to prescribe the rules that make discourses rational.
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