Introduction
The subject of this post is the special case thesis formulated by Robert Alexy. According to this thesis, legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse.
Types and characteristics of legal discourse
The general practical discourse has two main characteristics: 1) it discusses issues related to value judgments and norms that oblige, allow or prohibit certain actions to be practiced; 2) this discussion is made under the claim that value judgments and norms are correct.
There are several types of legal discussions (Alexy, 1989, p. 211): a) legal disputes in parliament; b) debates in legal science; c) statements by the parties and the judge in the judicial process; d) and debates in other environments.
These types of legal discussions can be called discourse, as they also have the two main characteristics of general practical discourse. The special characteristic of legal discourse is its limitation by legislation, legal doctrine, and judicial precedents (Alexy, 1989, p. 179-180).
Conclusion
Legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse because it shares its two main characteristics, but is limited by legislation, legal doctrine, and judicial precedents.
Bibliographic references
ALEXY, Robert. A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification. Translated by Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick. 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.