Chiassoni (2020, p. 157-158) argues that the expression “interpretative argument” can refer to at least three different things: 1) a major premise of a syllogism; 2) a model of argument; and 3) a concrete argument.
He (Chiassoni, 2020, p. 159) considers it advisable not to use the term “argument” to refer to the major premise of a syllogism, but only to refer to a model of argument or a concrete argument. Chiassoni understands that the major premise of a syllogism should be called the “directive”.
He (Chiassoni, 2020, p. 113 and 132) notes that jurists employ interpretative directives of different levels in their professional practice. Chiassoni elaborates his theory seeking merely to describe these directives and group them into what he calls an interpretative code; that is, he does not intend to prescribe, but only to describe the set of these directives. They are tiered into three levels: a) primary; b) secondary; and c) tertiary.
Bibliographic references
CHIASSONI, Pierluigi. Técnica da interpretação jurídica: breviário para juristas. Translated by Daniel Mitidiero, Otávio Domit, Rafael Abreu and Vitor de Paula Ramos. São Paulo: Thomson Reuters Brasil, 2020.