Introduction
The theme of this post is the forms of systematic arguments in the strict sense in judicial decisions in Robert Alexy’s view. These forms concern the logical relationships between legal norms.
Continue readingInterpretative arguments
Forms of external justification using teleological arguments in judicial decisions
Introduction
This post deals with the forms of teleological arguments in judicial decisions according to Robert Alexy. These forms refer to arguments used to support that a norm should be interpreted in a certain way due to its objective purposes.
Continue readingForms of external justification using comparative arguments in judicial decisions
Introduction
In this post, I analyze the forms of comparative arguments in judicial decisions from Robert Alexy’s perspective (1989, p. 239-240). Such forms adopt as a reference the state of affairs in one society to argue that an interpretation of a norm should or should not be accepted in another society.
Continue readingForms of external justification using historical arguments in judicial decisions
Introduction
This post examines the forms of historical arguments in judicial decisions according to Robert Alexy (1989, p. 239). These forms use historical learning to argue that an interpretation of a norm should or should not be accepted.
Continue readingForms of external justification using genetic arguments in judicial decisions
Introduction
The subject of this post is the forms of genetic arguments analyzed by Robert Alexy. These forms are used to argue that a legal norm should be interpreted in a certain way because that would be the will of the legislator.
Continue readingForms of external justification using semantic arguments in judicial decisions
Introduction
In this post, I analyze the forms of semantic arguments identified by Robert Alexy. These forms are employed to contend that a legal norm should be interpreted in a certain way based on how language is used.
Continue readingEvaluation of Pierluigi Chiassoni’s approach to legal interpretative directives
Chiassoni’s approach is only useful for accurately identifying the primary, secondary, and tertiary directives that judges adopt in their decisions, as he does not present parameters for evaluating the correctness of the use of these directives. This lack of evaluation criteria stems from Chiassoni’s skeptical theoretical assumptions about judicial interpretation.
Continue readingSecondary and tertiary directives for legal interpretation identified by Pierluigi Chiassoni
Secondary directives
Chiassoni (2020, p. 162) identifies three groups of secondary directives, which hierarchize the use of primary directives: 1) selective directives; 2) procedural directives; 3) and preferential directives.
Continue readingPrimary directives for legal interpretation identified by Pierluigi Chiassoni
Primary directives (Chiassoni, 2020, p. 133) indicate to the interpreter how to proceed in assigning at least one meaning to a provision. Chiassoni (2020, p. 134) lists twenty-eight primary directives grouped into six categories:
1) directives for linguistic interpretation;
2) directives for (pseudo)psychological interpretation;
3) directives for authoritative interpretation;
4) directives for teleological interpretation;
5) directives for systematic interpretation;
6) and directives for heteronomous interpretation.
Continue readingDirectives for legal interpretation according to Pierluigi Chiassoni
Chiassoni (2020, p. 157-158) argues that the expression “interpretative argument” can refer to at least three different things: 1) a major premise of a syllogism; 2) a model of argument; and 3) a concrete argument.
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