Introduction
In this post, I analyze the forms of semantic arguments identified by Robert Alexy. These forms are employed to contend that a legal norm should be interpreted in a certain way based on how language is used.
Facts and semantic arguments
Semantic arguments rely on facts about language use. This use can be proven in three ways (Alexy, 1989, p. 235):
1) linguistic competence of those who are using the language;
2) empirical investigation into how people use language;
3) dictionaries.
Three forms of semantic arguments
Consider that R is an abstract norm, W is a rule of word use, and R’ is a concrete norm obtained by interpreting R with the help of W.
There are three forms of semantic arguments (Alexy, 1989, p. 235):
(J.3.1) By reason of Wi, R’ must be accepted as an interpretation of R.
(J.3.2) By reason of Wk, R’ cannot be accepted as an interpretation of R.
(J.3.3) It is possible to accept and not accept R’ as an interpretation of R, since neither Wi nor Wk holds.
(J.3.1) authorizes the acceptance of an interpretation, and (J.3.2) is employed primarily in the refutation of an interpretation suggested by others.
While these two forms are conclusive, (J.3.3) is undefined about the acceptance of an interpretation. Such vagueness arises from the absence of rules of use of language favorable or contrary applicable to the interpretation proposed for the abstract norm. In this case, it is necessary to resort to forms of argument that are different from the forms of arguments about the use of language.
Conclusion
The first two forms of semantic arguments produce conclusive results on the acceptance or non-acceptance of interpretation of an abstract norm based on rules of word usage. However, the result of the third form of semantic argument is not conclusive.
Bibliographic references
ALEXY, Robert. A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification. Translated by Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick. 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.