This post deals with the forms of teleological arguments in judicial decisions according to Robert Alexy. These forms refer to arguments used to support that a norm should be interpreted in a certain way due to its objective purposes.
Continue readingThis post examines the forms of historical arguments in judicial decisions according to Robert Alexy (1989, p. 239). These forms use historical learning to argue that an interpretation of a norm should or should not be accepted.
Continue readingThe subject of this post is the forms of genetic arguments analyzed by Robert Alexy. These forms are used to argue that a legal norm should be interpreted in a certain way because that would be the will of the legislator.
Continue readingIn this post, I analyze the forms of semantic arguments identified by Robert Alexy. These forms are employed to contend that a legal norm should be interpreted in a certain way based on how language is used.
Continue readingThe theme of this post is the external justification with regard to facts in judicial decisions from Robert Alexy’s perspective.
Continue readingThis post deals with the distinction between internal and external justification of judicial decisions according to Robert Alexy.
Continue readingThis post deals with the rules of transition between general practical discourse and other types of discourse. In the general practical discourse, value judgments and norms that oblige, allow or prohibit certain actions to be practiced are discussed. The other types of discourse are necessary when questions arise about facts, language problems, and discourse theory. These rules apply equally to legal discourse because it is a special case of general practical discourse.
Continue readingIn this post, I examine the argumentative rules that directly define the content of norms and value judgments in general practical discourse. These rules are called justification rules by Robert Alexy (1989, p. 202) and are transcribed and examined in the next section. Since legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse, the rules of the latter apply to the former as well.
Continue readingThe theme of this post is six forms to justify a norm complied with by an individual in a concrete situation. These forms also serve to justify a value judgment applied by an individual in a concrete situation. The forms establish procedures of justification, but do not define the content of norms and value judgments.
Continue readingIn this post, I analyze the rules for allocating the burden of argument. They aim to rationally regulate the situations in which speakers are obliged to provide arguments in general practical discourses. Robert Alexy (1989, p. 196-197) developed them as follows:
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