Theoretical discourse

Rules of transition between general practical discourse and other types of discourse in Robert Alexy’s view

Timotheu Garcia PessoaLeave a comment

Introduction

This post deals with the rules of transition between general practical discourse and other types of discourse. In the general practical discourse, value judgments and norms that oblige, allow or prohibit certain actions to be practiced are discussed. The other types of discourse are necessary when questions arise about facts, language problems, and discourse theory. These rules apply equally to legal discourse because it is a special case of general practical discourse.

Continue reading →

Argumentative rules that define the content of norms and value judgments according to Robert Alexy

Timotheu Garcia Pessoa1 Comment

Introduction

In this post, I examine the argumentative rules that directly define the content of norms and value judgments in general practical discourse. These rules are called justification rules by Robert Alexy (1989, p. 202) and are transcribed and examined in the next section. Since legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse, the rules of the latter apply to the former as well.

Continue reading →

Six forms to justify norms and value judgments from Robert Alexy’s perspective

Timotheu Garcia Pessoa2 Comments

Introduction

The theme of this post is six forms to justify a norm complied with by an individual in a concrete situation. These forms also serve to justify a value judgment applied by an individual in a concrete situation. The forms establish procedures of justification, but do not define the content of norms and value judgments.

Continue reading →

How to rationally distribute the burden of argumentation

Timotheu Garcia Pessoa2 Comments

In this post, I analyze the rules for allocating the burden of argument. They aim to rationally regulate the situations in which speakers are obliged to provide arguments in general practical discourses. Robert Alexy (1989, p. 196-197) developed them as follows:

Continue reading →

Rationality of argumentation depends on equal argumentative rights and justifiable assertions

Timotheu Garcia Pessoa2 Comments

In another post, I analyzed the first group of argumentative rules that aim to ensure the rationality of general practical discourse. In this post, I examine the second group, which Alexy (1989, p. 191-195) calls rationality rules and formulates as follows:

Continue reading →

Basic rules ensure a minimum of rationality in argumentation

Timotheu Garcia Pessoa2 Comments

In the previous post, I presented an overview of Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation. I explained that he argues that legal discourse is a type of general practical discourse and that the rationality of discourses is ensured by adherence to argumentative rules.

Continue reading →

Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation

Timotheu Garcia PessoaLeave a comment

From the cover of his first book, Robert Alexy has been using the terms discourse and argumentation synonymously. Despite this pattern of usage, he (Alexy, 1989, p. 180) favors the word discourse, as he names his theory of argumentation a theory of discourse. Alexy (1989, p. 180) further classifies his theory as normative because it does not aim to describe the rules of argumentation actually employed by specific individuals, but rather to prescribe the rules that make discourses rational.

Continue reading →