• Forms of external justification using teleological arguments in judicial decisions

  July 13, 2026

  Introduction

  This post deals with the forms of teleological arguments in judicial decisions according to Robert Alexy. These forms refer to arguments used to support that a norm should be interpreted in a certain way due to its objective purposes.

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• Forms of external justification using historical arguments in judicial decisions

  June 20, 2026

  Introduction

  This post examines the forms of historical arguments in judicial decisions according to Robert Alexy (1989, p. 239). These forms use historical learning to argue that an interpretation of a norm should or should not be accepted.

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• Forms of external justification using genetic arguments in judicial decisions

  June 13, 2026

  Introduction

  The subject of this post is the forms of genetic arguments analyzed by Robert Alexy. These forms are used to argue that a legal norm should be interpreted in a certain way because that would be the will of the legislator.

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• Forms of external justification using semantic arguments in judicial decisions

  May 31, 2026

  Introduction

  In this post, I analyze the forms of semantic arguments identified by Robert Alexy. These forms are employed to contend that a legal norm should be interpreted in a certain way based on how language is used.

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• Rules of transition between general practical discourse and other types of discourse in Robert Alexy’s view

  April 1, 2026

  Introduction

  This post deals with the rules of transition between general practical discourse and other types of discourse. In the general practical discourse, value judgments and norms that oblige, allow or prohibit certain actions to be practiced are discussed. The other types of discourse are necessary when questions arise about facts, language problems, and discourse theory. These rules apply equally to legal discourse because it is a special case of general practical discourse.

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• Argumentative rules that define the content of norms and value judgments according to Robert Alexy

  March 24, 2026

  Introduction

  In this post, I examine the argumentative rules that directly define the content of norms and value judgments in general practical discourse. These rules are called justification rules by Robert Alexy (1989, p. 202) and are transcribed and examined in the next section. Since legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse, the rules of the latter apply to the former as well.

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• Six forms to justify norms and value judgments from Robert Alexy’s perspective

  March 17, 2026

  Introduction

  The theme of this post is six forms to justify a norm complied with by an individual in a concrete situation. These forms also serve to justify a value judgment applied by an individual in a concrete situation. The forms establish procedures of justification, but do not define the content of norms and value judgments.

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• How to rationally distribute the burden of argumentation

  March 8, 2026

  In this post, I analyze the rules for allocating the burden of argument. They aim to rationally regulate the situations in which speakers are obliged to provide arguments in general practical discourses. Robert Alexy (1989, p. 196-197) developed them as follows:

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• Rationality of argumentation depends on equal argumentative rights and justifiable assertions

  March 3, 2026

  In another post, I analyzed the first group of argumentative rules that aim to ensure the rationality of general practical discourse. In this post, I examine the second group, which Alexy (1989, p. 191-195) calls rationality rules and formulates as follows:

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• Basic rules ensure a minimum of rationality in argumentation

  February 24, 2026

  In the previous post, I presented an overview of Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation. I explained that he argues that legal discourse is a type of general practical discourse and that the rationality of discourses is ensured by adherence to argumentative rules.

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Category: Theoretical discourse